Economic cooperation between the US and Kenya has reflected the ups and downs in the relations between the two countries. Since independence, both countries have converged on security issues and diverged on questions of democracy and human rights. When Barack Obama was elected as the President of the US, Kenya expected to get an "Obama bonus" in the form of closer trade and investment cooperation. This article analyzes what is the image of USKenya economic relations in the news discourse. The analysis reveals that three different and competing narratives are present in the news discourse in Kenya. The US disseminates a narrative that economy, security, good governance and human resources are four interconnected and mutually reinforcing pillars of African development; Kenya must make progress in all these four pillars, and the US is ready to help Kenya. Kenyan leaders seem to internalize the economic part of the narrative and accept the nexus between economy and security, but they reject the nexus between economy and political issues. Finally, the Kenyan society internalizes both these narratives, albeit to a different degree, with the latter prevailing over the former. However, it also produces its own narrative, which presents current US-Kenya economic relations in a different perspective.
Introduction
Election of Barack Obama as the president of the US caused "pure excitement throughout the African continent" (Ilo 2015, 289) , particularly in Kenya, his father's homeland. Shortly after being elected, he outlined four pillars of his Africa policy: democracy and good governance, economic opportunity, and attraction (values, culture, ideas) . Although soft power is increasingly important in the globalized and interconnected world, it does not replace hard power but rather complements it. World politics is "a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally" (Nye 2004, 4) . Each of these "chessboards" is relevant in different degrees in different relationships (Nye 2004, 30) . Smart power is neither hard nor soft; it is both (Nye 2004, xiii) . Unlike hard power, soft power is a two-way relationship. It depends not only on intentions and actions of the projecting country but also on acceptance by the receiving audiences. The projecting country must frame its objectives into a coherent story, which will be persuasive for the intended or potential audience, at least more persuasive than the stories of other countries. Contemporary politics is about "whose story wins" (Nye 2004, 106) . Soft power is to a large extent communication power. This communicative dimension of international relations is captured by the theory of strategic narratives. This theory takes into account the formation of narratives within the projecting country, the projection of narratives from the projecting country to the receiving country and the reception of narratives in the receiving country (Miskimmon et al. 2012, 6-7) . Strategic narratives are "future oriented identity claims that articulate a distinctive (national/regional) position on a specific issue or policy domain" (Miskimmon et al. 2012, 4) , including global economic relations. Their power effect is domestically constitutive (creating identity) and internationally behavioral (shaping behavior). They are a communicative tool for political elites. Their aims are:
• to construct a shared meaning to the past, present and future of international politics; • to articulate state's interests, values and aspirations for the international order; • to articulate end states and ways how to achieve them; • to manage expectations about behavior in the international system; • to change the discursive environment;
• to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors and • to extend own influence (Miskimmon et al. 2012, 3-4; Miskimmon et al. 2013, 2-4) . Strategic narratives go beyond the state-centric level and focus also on different non-state actors such as interest groups, private sector, NGOs, universities, churches and media.
Media news is naturally occurring and widely disseminated text appearing in the normal day-to-day activities (Phillips -Hardy 2002, 71) . It is also a very important tool for public diplomacy, through which narratives can be projected. However, media news is not only a tool for the dissemination of narratives but also an actor of its own. Mainstream news editors and journalists are important gatekeepers. They can reproduce a strategic narrative, keep it out or authoritatively reinterpret it for audiences (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 157) . In this respect, (mainstream) media are not neutral or rational mediators, but part of the political, social and economic status quo. They (in)directly presuppose some positions or opinions and help to reproduce preformulated ideologies (van Dijk 1988, 179) . However, media are important sites not only for the reproduction but also for the contestation of official discourses (Weldes 2006, 182) . Naturally, not all voices appear in the media, and those that do appear are not expressed on equal terms (Phillips -Hardy 2002, 85) ; this is partly dependent upon the level of press freedom in any given country and upon the level of independence of any given media. Moreover, readers rarely create their knowledge solely from media news. Rather, they compare it with their previous knowledge within the framework of prevailing collective ideologies. Thus, news discourse serves as a filter between preformulated ideas of elites and everyday stories of people (van Dijk, cited in Wodak 1996, 109) . It is a frame through which the social world is constructed (van Dijk 1988, vii, 8) . News reports "are the main form of public discourse that provides the general outline of social, political, cultural, and economic models of social events, as well as the pervasively dominant knowledge and attitude structures that make such models intelligible" (van Dijk 1988, 182) . Analyzing local media is thus one of the possible and promising directions for a research of strategic narratives and their projection and reception. Such an analysis can reveal which narratives circulate within the public space, who is advocating them and whether and how these narratives clash and affect each other. To tackle with these questions, interpretive textual content analysis will be used. It is a formalized method to analyze the content of written texts in an interpretative way. It uses a fixed set of categories that guide data collection from documents and enable sorting and comparing the data. 
Brief History of the US-Kenya Economic Relations Containing the Soviet Union
Historically, Africa was considered to be a European sphere of influence (Ilo 2015, 283) . The US refrained from forging a strong relationship with the continent until decolonization created both trade opportunities and political dangers. For Eisenhower and Kennedy, economic cooperation was a means of attracting African leaders into the Western camp. Economic relations between the US and Kenya were established before the latter's independence (Moegi 1993, 57, 87) and strengthened in the following decade as Kenya followed a free-market approach and had a high rate of economic growth. However, the US engagement remained limited, because it had no direct strategic or economic interests in Africa (Lawson 2007, 1) . Foreign policy under Johnson, Nixon and Ford focused on the competition with the Soviet Union. Africa was just "an adjunct of the West/East struggle" (Waters 2009, li) with the only aim to contain the Soviet influence on the continent (Banjo 2010, 140-141) . The US-Africa policy was reactive, not proactive (Ilo 2015, 284) . The US sent economic and military assistance to key allies and anticommunist rebel organizations with the aim to create a system of friendly regional powers and to undermine the Soviet client states (Waters 2009, lx) . Kenya was the only anti-communist country in East Africa and became a strategic US partner. This partnership culminated in 1980, when the two countries signed a military agreement that enabled the US to utilize facilities in Kenya and helped Kenya to deter the Somalian leader Siad Barre from attacking its territory. Paradoxically, agreement was signed under the presidency of Carter, who wished to overcome the Cold War logic and introduce to US-Africa policy new issues such as development, human rights and majority rule in Southern Africa. The revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan changed the international environment and pushed Carter toward accepting the Cold War logic (Waters 2009, lxii-lxiv) . Reagan continued with this hardline realism and aimed to defeat the Soviet Union. Kenya remained one of the key allies in Africa. The US channeled financial assistance to Kenya in order to maintain politico-economic and national security co-operation. By 1990, Kenya became the largest recipient of US aid in Africa (Maina 2005, 27 ) and the US became the second-largest foreign investor in Kenya (Moegi 1993, 51) . This strategic partnership was not affected by ideological or political conflicts (Moegi 1993, 222) , and the US did not challenge the rising authoritarianism of the Moi regime in the 1980s.
Promoting Democracy and Human Rights
With the end of the Cold War, Bush sought to define a new Africa policy reflecting the US position as the sole global leader and emphasizing its core values: peace, democracy, human rights, development and market economy. Bush ceased to support long-term allies with authoritarian regimes and pressed them to democratize (Waters 2009, lxvi) . The US started to criticize democratic deficiencies in Kenya after the rigged general elections in March 1988 (Moegi 1993, 188) . When the police violently ended the opposition meeting in July 1990, the US Congress proposed the suspension of US aid to Kenya. Between 1989 and 1991, aid dropped by almost two-thirds (Moegi 1993, 111) . Nevertheless, the realist logic was not fully over. Despite widespread criticism, the Kenyan government received more than 160 million USD in debt forgiveness from the US as a reward for its support and cooperation during the Gulf War (Moegi 1993, 97) . Thus, "the Bush Administration cannot be attributed to have had a consistent voice calling for democratic reforms [and] human rights improvements in Kenya" (Maina 2005, 28) . However, delays with the constitutional reforms, arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and violations of human rights eventually led to suspending aid to Kenya in November 1991 (Mezzell 2010, 80) . Only one month later, Moi reluctantly agreed to end one-party rule. Under Clinton, the Africa policy was initially ad hoc, inconsistent and driven by domestic concerns rather than a vision (Waters 2009, lxvii) . He followed the sentiment of US public that foreign policy had lost its importance and prioritized domestic issues. After the debacle in Somalia, he halted military aid to Africa, passed the strict legal conditions on the US participation in peacekeeping missions and passed budgetary cuts to foreign aid (Hesse 2005, 327-329) . Support for the democratization of Africa also dampened, and the US foreign policy prioritized stabilization over political liberalization (Lawson 2007, 3) .
Promoting Trade and Investment
Reactionary approach during the first term was replaced by an opportunistic approach during the second term (Hesse 2005, 338) . For Clinton, free markets, democracy and human rights were seen as "intimately interwoven," and his foreign policy aimed to "increase the size and scope of the zone of market democracies". However, calls for a promotion of human rights were secondary and followed "only when and where it complemented (...) the economic imperatives of America's foreign policy" (Holland 2016, 5) . Africa was acknowledged as a major emerging market with a wealth of resources and the only continent for which the US had no trade policy (Hesse 2005, 331) . In 2000, the Congress approved the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offering trade preferences to African exporters. However, access to the US market was conditioned by economic reforms and adherence to market-based economy and free trade (Hesse 2005, 332-333) , which were seen as a right mechanism for development and democratization (Banjo 2010, 143) . The Africa policy under Clinton was based on "development through trade" approach (Banjo 2010, 140) . It aimed to increase trade, while foreign aid was at historic lows (Ilo 2015, 286) . This "words rather than resources" approach (Hesse 2005, 330) confirmed that Africa continued to have a "low priority status" for the US (Mezzell 2010, 83) . US-Kenyan relations entered the "business as usual" mode and focused on trade and investment (Maina 2005, 67; Mabera 2016, 371) . However, the US still recognized the defining features of the Kenyan political-economic system: poor governance and low accountability of the government, high levels of corruption, the lack of progress on reforms, inadequate infrastructure, insecurity and the low level of human rights record. Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank suspended new programs after the 1997 elections (Machar 2015, 196) . Similarly, when President Clinton visited Africa in 1998 to meet with "a new generation of African leaders" (Waters 2009, lxviii) , Kenya was by-passed. Hostile business environment in the country also discouraged US investors.
Waging the War on Terror
After September 11, 2001, George W Bush integrated security, economic development and political US interests in Africa into the broader framework of the War on Terror. It contained different measures capable to eradicate poverty, to improve the quality of life and to decrease the prevalence of extremism and terrorism on the continent (Hesse 2005, 334-335) . He was a strong proponent of free markets, but he complemented trade and investment agenda with generous aid packages (Waters 2009, lxx) . He rewarded economic freedom and neoliberal reforms with aid under the Millennium Challenge Account, focusing on agriculture, energy sector and infrastructure (White 2010, 8; Agyeman-Duah 2015, 38) . He directed an unprecedented amount of money to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and malaria. He also supported education and signed into debt relief initiatives for developing countries. In 2003, Kenya refused to endorse the invasion of Iraq without a UN mandate, opposed the establishment of US military base in the country, disapproved the Suppression of Terrorism Act and refused to sign agreement with the US on impunity of its citizens. The US declared Kenya an unsafe country and advised its citizens not to travel there (Maina 2005, 57-59) . However, common security interests helped to overcome these tensions. Kenya recognized "the need for a pragmatic foreign policy that is sensitive to the geopolitical and economic dimensions of opportunistic security threats, such as piracy and terrorism" (Mabera 2016, 372) . The US needed Kenya as an anchor country in the global war on terror. In 2008, Kenya became once again the leading African recipient of US foreign aid (Ilo 2015, 288) . Paradoxically, as Bush "has made African development and eradication of disease important albeit secondary foreign policy goals, (...) by the end of his presidency many commentators were calling his Africa policy the most positive aspect of his foreign policy legacy" (Waters 2009, l) . However, "rhetoric about the role of Africa in the war on terrorism has amounted to very little actual change in the U.S. approach to Africa" (Lawson 2007, 9) . Africa has remained marginal, and the US did not have a clear Africa policy (Agyeman-Duah 2015, 34).
Expectations and Results of the Obama Presidency
This brief summary shows that close partnership stemmed from shared security interests and was reflected in high levels of US aid to Kenya. On the other side, the US was much less important partner in investment and trade. Moreover, President Mwai Kibaki focused his economic diplomacy on China and other Asian countries under the so-called "Look East policy" (Mabera 2016, 378) . In 2008, Prime Minister Raila Odinga expressed his faith that Obama's election as the president of the US would lead to the expansion of relationships in terms of trade, direct investments and the influx of US tourists. Although close security cooperation was expected to continue, the main "Obama bonus" was seen in the economic domain and a greater prosperity for Kenya (Mathenge et al. 2008) . Munyi (2018, 51-53) differentiated four periods in US-Kenyan relations under Obama. In the first period, mutual relations became less cordial (Machar 2015, 189) . There were big disagreements on democracy, fight against corruption, tribalism and justice. Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed for constitutional reforms (Dumbuya 2015, 12) .
Economic relations stagnated, although it is not clear whether due to political tension or US economic situation amid the financial crisis. In mid-2011, the US ceased to criticize governance in Kenya and mutual relations entered the second period of "benign silence from both sides", reflecting the fact that both countries headed for the elections (Munyi 2018, 51) . The third period started in 2013 when relations worsened due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) issue. In its final report, the governmentsponsored Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence identified the perpetrators and financiers of the violence. When the government refused to establish a special tribunal to try suspects, the six most responsible individuals were referred to the ICC (Mabera 2016, 368) . Two of them, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, announced their intention to run in the 2013 elections for presidency and vice-presidency respectively. The British High Commissioner to Kenya Christian Turner announced that Britain would avoid regular contact with individuals charged by the ICC, meaning that Kenyan leaders would face travel bans and asset freezes if elected (Pflanz 2013) . While Obama called for peaceful election reflecting the will of the people, without endorsing any of the candidates, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson warned that "people should be thoughtful about the impact that their choices have on their nation" and that these "choices have consequences" (Joselow 2013) , causing a diplomatic discord. In his inaugural speech, Kenyatta delineated four directions of his foreign policy: pan-Africanism, regionalism, Kenyan nationalism and multilateralism. His political rhetoric was directed against western governments, but the onslaught on the "imperialist West" and the adherence to pan-Africanism aimed to counteract the negative publicity associated with the ongoing ICC trials (Obala 2014, 6-8) . US-Kenyan relations were "suspicious, tentative and tepid" (Munyi 2018, 52) and marked by harsh rhetoric from both sides, but in reality, there was no radical break between the two countries (Mabera 2016, 373) . In 2014, relations started to improve as both leaders put aside the political questions and focused on economic and security cooperation. 1 In the economic domain, some results were visible. Exports from Kenya to the US under Obama had increased gradually and more than doubled. However, this rise had copied the general trend of rising Kenyan exports, while the territorial structure of export has not substantially changed. The US share on Kenyan exports oscillated between 5.5% and 7.5% throughout the period. Positive trend was much less clear for US exports to Kenya. Between 2008 and 2013, exports increased by half. In 2014, exports increased almost three times. In 2015, exports decreased by more than a third. In 2016, exports further decreased by almost two-thirds. In relative terms, the US share on Kenyan imports moved from 3.5% in 2008 to 10.5% in 2014 and then back to 3.5% in 2016.
2 From these figures it is unclear whether the upswing of US exports was only temporary, but it seems that the volatility of US exports to Kenya remains high. The flow of US investment to Kenya started to rise in 2011 and peaked in 2014. Then, it fell down, but remained above the initial level. In 2016, the overall US stock was the second highest behind India, surmounting the British or Chinese stock (Munyi 2018, 59 ). This is a result of the Power Africa Initiative, which Obama announced in 2013 with the aim to mobilize private funding for investment in energy and electricity production. The US government committed 7 billion USD for Kenya, and private US companies added 4 billion USD through project funding (Munyi 2018, 58) . Kenya also continued to be one of the biggest African beneficiaries of the US military aid under the new Security Governance Initiative. Finally, all the necessary steps to start the operation of direct flights were undertaken.
Summit in Washington (August 2014), extension of the AGOA preferential trade regime (June 2015) and Obama's visit to Kenya (July 2015).
Media Environment in Kenya
Source data for the analysis are the articles from the leading Kenyan newspaper The Daily Nation. Although this research relies on a single source of data, which poses a certain limitation, the chosen newspaper is an independent widely read newspaper operating within free media environment. It is likely to offer space for different voices, including the non-official ones. Analysis of media coverage of the 2007 election campaign and election violence shows that beyond their initial role of informing, main newspapers also provided a forum for a broad political debate (Rambaud 2008, 88) . The Daily Nation is a reliable source of data as it is a very representative example of the Kenyan news discourse -although it is by no means a discourse representing the whole public arena in the country. In 2002, media were granted full freedom of expression (Rambaud 2008, 59-60) . Press freedom is guaranteed by the 2010 Constitution, which prohibits the state from interfering with the editorial independence of media outlets. Local private media provide rigorous and critical coverage of politics and a diversity of views (Reporters without Borders 2017; Freedom House 2016). Media in Kenya are "vibrant, critically engaged and balanced" (Cheeseman 2014) . Newspapers remain the most important source of information for a significant part of Kenyan adult population. Obviously, there is a great urban/rural divide and 60% of rural people assert that they have never read a newspaper (Cheeseman 2014) . For those people, the most popular news source is radio, particularly number of stations broadcasting in vernacular languages. However, these radio stations are geographically and culturally limited and do not represent a broad societal discourse. The Daily Nation is the most important Kenyan newspaper, which is read by up to 20% of population over 15 years.
5 It has the strongest position even among the youth to 24 years (GeoPoll 2015) . Readership of The Daily Nation is also regionally diffused with the strongest position in Central Province and Nairobi (Rambaud 2008, 79) . Moreover, articles from The Daily Nation are published also on its website, which is among the ten most visited websites in Kenya (Nyabuga -Booker 2013, 21) . The Daily Nation is an independent newspaper published by the Nation Media Group (NMG). NMG is a private company founded in 1959 by the British business magnate, philanthropist and religious leader Aga Khan IV. NMG is listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange with 45% of shares owned by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development. NMG's editorial policy stresses independence from vested interests or external influences, responsibility for allowing different views to be expressed and focus on the objective and generally constructive criticism offered in the interests of the public at large. 6 Empirical analysis shows that during electoral campaign in 2007, "the main media houses made a concerted effort to promote responsible journalism" and to achieve "quantitative impartiality" with a balanced coverage between the three main candidates (Rambaud 2008, 57-58, 77) . This confirms that journalism of The Daily Nation complies with the NMG editorial policy.
US Narrative
The US narrative on the principles of its cooperation with Africa can be best derived from the quotations and writings of key US representatives. (1) This article starts with a brief information on the new US strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, adopted two months earlier. The author summarizes that the new US approach is shifting focus from development aid and "idealistic development goals" to facilitating trade and investment. He explains this new approach as a reaction to growing China's influence on the continent.
Words by Hillary Clinton confirms that trade and investment cooperation started to gain attraction among US policymakers, while not putting the governance agenda completely aside. In fact, both democratic governance and economic growth were defined as pillars of the US strategy toward Africa; thus supposedly, they were seen as not mutually exclusive goals. In August 2014, Obama organized the first US-Africa Leaders Summit, an antipode to a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is organized by China every three years since 2000. The main focus of the summit was on economic and security cooperation. Obama invited leaders from fifty African countries, including some of the strongmen, thus effectively leaving the issues of governance aside. 7 The summit was extensively covered in the Kenyan press, and quotations from Barack Obama 
" (8)
The presented excerpts show that US relations with Kenya follow the four pillars delineated in the 2012 African strategy and that these pillars are interconnected. The US narrative can be summarized in the following way: the US will cooperate with Africa so as the continent participates more actively on the global economic relations and benefits from them, but this requires that Africa improves its score on security, democracy and human rights, infrastructure and human capital, with which the US is ready to help Africa. Robert Godec (who started his mission in January 2013) seems to be consistent in stressing economy, security and governance as three important arenas for US-Kenyan relations and prerequisites for Kenyan development. Barack Obama himself seems to be less consistent. On one side, he came to Kenya to attend the Global Entrepreneurship Summit, but his agenda was by no means limited to the economic domain. He focused also on security, development and good governance. He went so far to stress gay rights as part of democratic governance, which caused an open clash with his Kenyan hosts. On the other side, his flagship event -the US-Africa Leaders Summitunambiguously prioritized economic agenda and Obama was not shy to take pictures with the invited African strongmen. Naturally, this weakened his calling for democratic reforms in Africa. Moreover, Obama distanced himself from the George W Bush practice of "exporting democracy" and instead aimed to present the US as a positive example of a democratic state and let African leaders to take the responsibility for positive changes in their countries (White 2010, 2, 5-6) . Although this approach may be more positively received in other countries, it also means that the US has at least partly lost leverage to assert the democratic agenda. These two aspects have important consequences for the persuasiveness of the US narrative and its acceptance. 
Reception by Kenyan Leaders

.) that Kenya as a country is not looking East or West," said President Kenyatta. (11)
The last remark clearly points out to the fact that the main interest of the Kenyan government is to sustain high economic growth. To fulfil this goal, Kenya is open to partner with any country regardless of its ideology, having the only aim to assure the necessary resources to finance the country's development, particularly the large infrastructure projects. It is a "purely business issue". What is interesting is that Kenyan leaders are willing to accept the nexus between economic and security issues, while they reject the nexus between economic and political issues. Article 4 focuses primarily on Barack Obama's speech and his "bag of goodies", while mentioning Uhuru Kenyatta only marginally.
His host President Uhuru Kenyatta said that fighting terrorism was a challenge to his government and asked for American support. (...) President Obama and his host did not, however, agree on all subjects with discussion about gay rights being the point of departure. Mr Kenyatta insisted that the subject was inconsistent with the African culture and it was thus imprudent to force it on Kenyans. He also reiterated that the subject was not on top of Kenyans minds at the moment. (...) Speaking after their bilateral meetings, the two presidents expressed confidence in the direction the Kenya-US partnership was headed. (4)
For the reporter, Kenyatta's reaction on economic cooperation was not important, which a reader can read as a confirmation of shared economic interests between the two countries. In the security domain, the reporter extensively covers what Obama said about anti-terrorist collaboration, followed by Kenyatta's demand to further deepen it (which Obama indeed promised). On the other side, in the political domain, Kenyatta emphasized the differences between American and African cultures as a justification for the rejection of the Obama's call for the need to improve the human rights record. Although gay rights are rather a marginal issue, it was highlighted in the article as "the point of departure" between the two presidents. This indicates that the reception of the US narrative among the Kenyan elites (as represented by the President) is different from its initial meaning. This is clearly confirmed in the opinion article written by the president's speechwriter. 
.) It was not always this way. And it is getting better every day. I am speaking about Kenya's capacity to testify the entrepreneurship, innovation, investment and growth on a transformative scale. (12)
This text is quite straightforward in contrasting economic agenda with the political one. The former is seen as "a rational conversation" between equal partners who share the interest in economic opportunities and investment. Thus, the latter seems to be viewed as an irrational conversation between a teacher and his seemingly disobedient pupil. Human rights and good governance are seen as relicts of the past. This is surprising as Obama during his visit spoke also about corruption, press freedom, accountability of leaders, democracy and even gay rights, thus going even further than George Bush and Bill Clinton in the 1990s. However, this part of Obama's address to Kenyans seems to be neglected or at least seen as inferior to economic and security issues. This is confirmed by an analysis of winners and losers of the Obama's visit (13) . According to the author, the biggest winner is President Kenyatta, whose standing has boosted, thanks to the visit. Other winners are cabinet secretaries for foreign affairs and international trade, industrialization and enterprise development and interior. Finally, youth and women entrepreneurs are seen also as winners. On the other side, main losers are opposition leaders ("their calls for US pressure on the Jubilee government were rejected") and mainstream civil society (which "was not accorded much time, space and recognition"). The reporter's observation thus confirms that Obama's visit prioritized economic and security agenda over the issues of democracy and human rights. This means that in Nairobi, Obama himself undermined the US narrative and weakened the connection between economic, security, political and development issues. If the constituent parts of the narrative are not in reality so closely interconnected as proclaimed, then it creates an opportunity for the receiving audience to take these parts as more or less separate narratives. This is exactly what Kenyan leaders do. They transform the US narrative and forward the message to the citizens in the following way: the US is a valuable partner for Kenyan development due to its investment into infrastructure, cooperation in the security sphere and financial support for the development initiatives.
Reception by Kenyan Society
Opinion articles and letters written by representatives of the civil society such as journalists -columnists, university scholars, lawyers and readers show a wider spectrum of how the US narrative is received. First position follows the US narrative and recognizes that the relationship between the two countries has a political, economic and security dimension. Kenyans are said to support democratic values and cooperate with the US to bolster these values in the region. (20) The third position lies somewhere between. It does not reject the US narrative as such, but it observes that it is the US itself that does not behave in accord with this narrative. US actions suggest that economic and security parts of the narrative are more important than political and development parts. "Soft" version of this position recognizes that the US still speaks about democracy and human rights in Africa, but that the tone has shifted from the criticizing one to the advising one. The "middle" version recognizes that the US still wishes to pursue democratic agenda in Africa, but that it changed (or had to change) means of how to achieve this goal. Instead of exerting top-down pressure on African leaders (political approach), the US has decided to support young innovative entrepreneurs to bring change from below (economic approach 
.) This reflects a broader trend in which the American government has been willing to compromise on governance issues where its security is at stake. (24)
Finally, there is also the fourth position, which represents fundamentally a different narrative. It denies not only the political issues but also the economic cooperation. Although the renewed US economic interest on Africa has the potential to foster African development by increased trade flows and investment, it is primarily a response to growing Chinese engagement on the continent. The US follows its own strategic interests, regardless of whether it they match with African interests and needs. According to different authors, Africa has never been a priority for the US, and Barack Obama has not changed that. His interest in Africa did not go beyond shallow symbolism, which is best represented by the US-Africa Leaders Summit. 8 The summit brought no real results, just promised of future investment. 
Conclusion
Obama's election was supposed to be a turning point in the US foreign policy (White 2010, 1) . He promised to change the outdated dogmas and renew idealism into the foreign policy (Unger 2016, 1-2) . Although Africa was barely mentioned during the election campaign, Obama showed more interest and knowledge than his predecessors. In his public statements, he focused on good governance and democracy as key topics (Mezzell 2010, 88) . Strengthening democratic institutions was mentioned as the first of four pillars of the US strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. This new strategy and the first US Africa Summit indicated that the Obama administration was giving more attention to the continent (Rye Olsen 2017, 73) . However, Obama's Africa policy was ambiguous as he coupled the cultivation of liberal democratic values with long-term national security interests (Dumbuya 2015, 9) . In some Countries such as Senegal, Liberia or Malawi, his administration pressed for democratic reforms and anti-corruption measures. In some countries such as Rwanda, Uganda or Ethiopia, he prioritized stability and aligned with authoritarian leaders (Unger 2016, 13) . In some countries such as Angola, Nigeria and Gabon, he focused on securing oil supplies and trade promotion, regardless of the authoritarian nature of their regimes. In this respect, Obama was a result-driven pragmatist (Holland 2016, 9) , not much different from his predecessors. Kenya seems to be somewhere between the first group and second group. Maina (2005, 65) identified three historical periods in the US policy toward Kenya, reflecting the US domestic priorities: containment of the Soviet influence, promotion of democracy and the war on terrorism. Since the independence, mutual relations have been convergent on security and economic cooperation and divergent on governance issues (Munyi 2018, 50 ). Obama did not change this. He continued with the anti-terrorist cooperation and experimented with the promotion of democracy and fight against corruption, but his main legacy is the Power Africa Initiative and huge amount of investment into Kenya's energy sector. Although he wished to focus his Africa policy on governance, his contribution was pragmatic and traditional -trade, investment and security. There is always a difference between the rhetorical vision of a presidential candidate and the dictates of the presidential office (Munyi 2018, 49-50) . This ambiguity is reflected in the local news discourse. The US wished to disseminate a narrative that economy, security, good governance and human resources are four interconnected, inseparable and mutually reinforcing parts of African development. If Kenya wishes to achieve its goal to become middleincome country by 2030, it must make progress in all these four pillars, with the help from the US. However, concrete actions of the US foreign policy in Africa were contradictory to this narrative. Although the US followed all these four pillars, some of them seemed to be more important than others. Any narrative is rarely heard as intended. It is always interpreted by audiences in the context of their own experience (Nye 2004, 111; Miskimmon et al. 2013, 169) . If the narrative is incoherent or if it does not match with actions, it is weak, less persuasive and more likely to be rejected or modified. Kenyan leaders seem to internalize the economic part of the narrative and accept the economic/security nexus, but they reject the economic/political nexus. They transform the narrative to highlight economic and security benefits from the cooperation with the US -the "Obama bonus". Those issues where the US and Kenyan views differ are concealed.
